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TEACHING COMPLIANCE 
D. Daniel Sokol* 
INTRODUCTION 
Compliance is a growing field of practice across multiple areas of law.  
Increasingly companies put compliance risk among the most important 
corporate governance issues facing them.1  Moreover, as “JD plus”2 jobs 
proliferate, the demand for hiring both at the entry level and for former 
students currently in practice who are experienced in the compliance field 
will continue to grow.  The growth in compliance jobs comes at a time in 
shifting demand for legal jobs for law school graduates.  Traditional entry 
level jobs at large law firms, which were the staple of on campus 
recruiting before 2007, have not returned to pre-2007 levels even with the 
end of the recession.3  Technological changes,4 greater in-house hiring,5 
and increased efficiencies6 have reduced demand for large law firms,7 
which were the traditional training ground for in-depth legal and soft 
skills. 
Law schools have responded to the demand shift in entry level hiring 
with a supply side response—classes in compliance.  In some cases, law 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law and Senior Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini 
Goodrich & Rosati.  I want to thank Larry Cunningham, Rob Rhee and Chuck Whitehead for their 
suggestions.   
 1. Deloitte & Compliance Week, In Focus: Compliance Trends Survey (May 2014), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us_aers_dcrs_deloitte_compliance_
week_compliance_survey_2014_05142014.pdf. 
 2. These jobs do not require a JD but JDs offer an advantage for such jobs.  They may include 
jobs in investment banks, management consulting, accounting firms, among others. 
 3. William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 3 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (2013) 
(explaining the shift in demand). 
 4. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ L. REV. 1169 
(2011). 
 5. Interview with Heather Fine, Managing Director, Major, Lindsey & Africa (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.mlaglobal.com/community/thought-leadership/hiring-and-compensation-trends-for-in-house 
(“As a general matter, there appears to be an increase in hiring of in-house counsel as companies are 
building their legal departments.”).   
 6. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL SERVICES (2010) (discussing the market trend of efficiencies gained in the working of the legal 
profession).  Efficiencies may take the form of process improvements, fee structures other than billable 
hours, improvements in project management, and better utilization of data analytics.  
 7. Value-Based Fees, Use of Legal Operations Function Help Companies Drive Time and Cost 
Savings, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/newsroom/accinthenews/inhouseblogaccrecognizesvaluechampions.cfm 
(“General counsel are using detailed data analysis to shape their law departments and applying technology 
and value-based fees (VBFs) to create solutions to expensive areas like discovery and litigation, the 
Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) announced at its 2015 ACC Value Champions press briefing 
today.”). 
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schools have set up compliance certificates or degrees in areas such as 
health care8 and business law.9  There is now even a casebook devoted to 
compliance.10  Yet, with all of these efforts at creating opportunities for 
careers in compliance, many programs and classes in compliance are 
nothing other than dressed up versions of classes in white collar crime or 
regulation or lectures on latest case developments that one might find in 
a continuing legal education program.  These courses do not focus on the 
substantive areas of practice needs with the highest demand for 
compliance (in-house legal and JD plus jobs) and do not teach the 
analytical skills necessary to succeed in such jobs.  Nor do these courses 
focus on the special context within which compliance operates—ideally 
independent of the “business” but always a part of it.11  Essentially, law 
schools have misdiagnosed the demand side—it is not merely the 
particular type of class (compliance) but also the substance of such classes 
with the type of quality offering necessary to maximize student needs 
short term (entry level hiring) and long term (preparation for ever-shifting 
analytically complex practice challenges).12   
This Essay suggests an alternative approach to teaching compliance—
one that focuses on the design and implementation of compliance 
programs.  The Essay explores the determinants of why teaching 
compliance is important, the pitfalls of current approaches, and the types 
of teaching innovations that sophisticated compliance practice requires.  
First, it explains what compliance is.  Then, it explains the basis for the 
current economic drivers of the increased focus on compliance by firms.  
Next, it identifies the drivers of illegality before explaining how law 
school and in-house compliance training might be better structured in 
 
 8. Healthcare Compliance Certification Programs, SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF L., 
http://law.shu.edu/compliance/health/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2015); Health Care Compliance Programs, 
CLEV.-MARSHALL C. OF L., https://www.law.csuohio.edu/programs/certificates/healthcarecompliance 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2015); Graduate Certificate in Healthcare Compliance, DREXEL UNIV. SCH. OF L., 
http://www.drexel.com/online-degrees/law-degrees/cert-hc-comp/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2015). 
 9. Online Master of Jurisprudence in Corporate and Business Law, WIDENER UNIV. SCH. OF L., 
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/prospective-students/compliance-programs/mj-in-corporate-business-
law/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2015). 
 10. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 
(2014). 
 11. Karl S. Okamoto, Teaching Transactional Lawyering, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 69 (2009); see also 
Lubomir P. Litov et al., Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations, 102 GEO. L.J. 413 
(2014) (providing a similar focus on the internal tensions within financial firms). 
 12. On this trend generally by law schools, see Larry E. Ribstein, Practicing Theory: Legal 
Education for the Twenty-First Century, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1649 (2011) (critiquing the current practice of 
legal education).  Competition across multiple dimensions is not unique to legal education.  This is also 
true in the area of health care provision, where there is competition across both cost and quality.  See e.g., 
Martin Gaynor et al., The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets, 53 J. ECON. LIT. 235 (2015); 
Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1969 
(2015). 
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both analytical approach and substance.  Finally, the Essay concludes 
with some thoughts about issues in compliance in which courses might 
want to place greater emphasis.   
I.  WHAT IS COMPLIANCE? 
Reducing compliance risk is a significant driver of corporate behavior.  
This is a function of a number of factors including responses to 
compliance related scandals,13 increased government enforcement,14 and 
increased awareness of how compliance impacts business performance in 
both day to day operations15 and as a consequence of mergers and 
acquisitions16 in what is an increasingly complex global regulatory 
system.17 
Compliance, however, means different things to different people 
within a company based on factors such as the industry sector and the 
particular level of actors within a firm.  For some, compliance relates to 
only board level issues.18  For others, it relates to senior managers,19 mid-
level managers,20 or employees.21  Compliance risk may be a function of 
issues that any company faces22 (e.g., Sarbanes Oxley,23 Dodd-Frank,24 
 
 13. Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on 
Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (2006); Xioyun Yu, Securities Fraud and Corporate Finance: Recent 
Developments, 34 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 439 (2013). 
 14. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated 
Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2014); BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: 
HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014). 
 15. Shannon W. Anderson et al., Why firms seek ISO certification: regulatory compliance or 
competitive advantage?, 8 PROD. & OPERATIONS MGMT. 28 (1999); Anne Riley & D. Daniel Sokol, 
Rethinking Compliance, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 31 (2015). 
 16. Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, Compliance, Detection, and Mergers and Acquisitions, 34 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 514 (2013). 
 17. Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 MICH. ST. INT'L. L. REV. 961 
(2014); Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011). 
 18. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the 
Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465 (2008); Ran Duchin et al., When Are Outside Directors 
Effective? 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (2010); Olubunmi Faleye et al., The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring, 
101 J. FIN. ECON. 160 (2011). 
 19. Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48 J. L. 
& ECON. 371 (2005). 
 20. D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785 (2014). 
 21. Ariana Levinson, Workplace Privacy and Monitoring: The Quest for Balanced Interests, 59 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377 (2011). 
 22. EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE (Christine Parker & Vibke Nielsen, eds., 2011). 
 23. John C. Coates & Suraj Srinivasan, SOX After Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 28 
ACCT. HORIZONS 627 (2014).  
 24. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011). 
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antitrust,25 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),26 data privacy,27 
insider trading,28 auditing,29 and tax30) or sector specific issues (e.g., 
financial services,31 health care32).  Because of the different meanings of 
compliance, it is important to identify the high risk areas for a company 
in order to best understand how to teach compliance and develop a 
compliance class or training program that may cover different issues 
depending on the emphasis of the level of person within the organization 
or the particular industry. 
These different meanings to compliance create a rather formidable task 
in writing on how to teach compliance.  In some ways, the richness of the 
particular type of compliance explains the difficulty in teaching a class on 
it effectively.  However, much like with various types of compliance, 
there are certain “best practices” to teaching compliance whether in the 
classroom or within complex domestic or global companies.   
II. REASONS SHAPING THE INCREASED FOCUS ON COMPLIANCE 
There are strong incentives for companies to move to a robust pro-
compliance program.33  Below is an outline of reasons at both firm and 
individual levels that create incentives for investment in compliance and 
creation of a pro-compliant culture across firms.  Additionally, increased 
penalties for non-compliance create more pressure for firms to comply. 
 
 25. Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 2014) [hereinafter 
OXFORD HANDBOOK]; GLOBAL ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (D. Daniel Sokol et al., eds.2015). 
 26. Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781 
(2013). 
 27. Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 373 
(2014). 
 28. Anup Agrawal & Tommy Cooper, Insider Trading Before Accounting Scandals, 34 J. CORP. 
FIN. 169 (2015). 
 29. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing's New Early Warning System: Control 
Disclosure, Auditor Liability, and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1449 (2004). 
 30. WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (Joel Slemrod, ed., 1992). 
 31. CLAIRE HILL & RICHARD M. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: PROMOTING GOOD 
BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT (2015). 
 32. LARS NOAH, NOAH’S LAW, MEDICINE AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY:  CASES AND MATERIALS 
(3d ed. 2012). 
 33. See generally, Déborah Philippe & Rodolphe Durand, The Impact of Norm-Conforming 
Behaviors On Firm Reputation, 32 STRAT. MGMT. J. 969 (2011); Jodi Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making 
Self-Regulation More than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN SCI. 
QUART. 361 (2010); Sokol, Policing the Firm, supra note 20.   
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A.  Firm Level 
1. Negative Stock Returns 
A number of empirical studies suggest that effective corporate 
governance positively impacts stock returns.34  Similarly, poor corporate 
governance and compliance may be linked to negative stock returns.35  
This lower stock price provides information about the relative state of a 
firm and its governance.  A lower stock price puts pressure on the firm to 
change its management because of the market for corporate control.36  
2. Financial Penalties 
Corporate wrongdoing may lead to the imposition of financial penalties 
by government enforcers.  The theoretical basis for the penalties is based 
on an optimal deterrence model.37  Over time, the severity of financial 
penalties has increased for companies in areas such as antitrust,38 
securities law,39 and catastrophic accidents.40  Significant financial 
penalties may create a negative impact on a firm’s stock price.  
3. Private Damages Suits 
Compliance problems expose firms not merely to government action 
 
 34. Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107 (2003); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 421 (2005); 
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). 
 35. Ying Cao et al., Company reputation and the cost of equity capital, 20 REV. ACCT. STUD. 42 
(2015); Litov et al., Lawyers and Fools, supra note 11. 
 36. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); 
JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 119 (2008); Daniel R Fischel, The Corporate Governance 
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1982).  Issues of corporate control impact not merely fully 
publicly owned firms but partially privatized state owned enterprises as well.  See Gongmeng Chen et al., 
Control transfers, privatization, and corporate performance: Efficiency gains in China’s listed 
companies, 41 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 161 (2008); Hamdi Ben Nasr et al., The Political 
Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms, 50 J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
605 (2012); D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713 (2009).   
 37. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968). 
 38. Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, 57 J.L. & ECON. 
S51 (2014).  
 39. David Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock 
Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561 (2007). 
 40. See Robert J. Rhee, A Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
33, 71-72 (2012) (showing the multi-billion dollar financial consequences from negative stock returns and 
direct liability resulting from British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico).  
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but to follow-on private suits.41  A significant literature exists on the 
merits of private lawsuits.42  Regardless of the merits of private 
enforcement, these suits are costly from a company perspective.  The cost 
is not merely because of the financial costs to the company as a result of 
settlement, as these cases often settle,43 but also because boards and 
managers are being distracted from their day to day jobs due to litigation 
activities such as depositions and document requests.  The fear of lengthy 
depositions also may chill lawful risk-taking by firms, which may chill 
incentives to innovate and grow the firm.44  
4. Reputational Effects 
The decrease in stock returns beyond merely the cost of the penalty and 
a return to the competitive level of the stock that reflects lawful financial 
reporting serves as the basis for a traditional analysis of the cost of 
wrongdoing.45  However, depending on the type of compliance issue, 
there may be a reputational penalty that impacts the stock price.46  
Professor Ed Iacobucci explains that “wrongs often signal something 
undesirable about the wrongdoer’s type, which costs the wrongdoer 
trading opportunities going forward.”47  The loss of reputation may affect 
 
 41. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 38 (1975).  Whether or not private rights are socially optimal is not clear.  In the securities area, see 
e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 
1503 (1996) (“[P]ayments by the corporation to settle a class action amount to transferring money from 
one pocket to the other, with about half of it dropping on the floor for lawyers to pick up.”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 621 
(1985) (“[T]he higher the payoff from suit; the higher the payoff, the more people will spend investigating 
and bringing suits.”). 
 42. Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002); James D. Cox & Randall S. 
Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737 (2003); Thomas E. 
Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on 
and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163 (1986); Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing 
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675 (2010); Landes & Posner, supra note 41; A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1562 (2006); James D. Cox et al., Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities 
Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893 (2005). 
 43. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials, 
8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 109 (1988). 
 44. D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business 
Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 (2012). 
 45. Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 25. 
 46. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581 (2008); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty 
Firms Bear for Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757 (1993); Deborah L. Murphy et al., 
Understanding the Penalties Associated with Corporate Misconduct: An Empirical Examination of 
Earnings and Risk, 44 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 55, 82-83 (2009). 
 47. Edward M. Iacobucci, On the Interaction between Legal and Reputational Sanctions, 43 J. 
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a firm with regard to customers, suppliers, or others.48  A reputational 
penalty also may lead to shaming of senior executives or boards of 
directors.49  For managers, the potential reputational effects of non-
compliance create incentives for these managers to run a firm more 
effectively to preserve or even enhance the value of their own 
reputation.50 
B. Individual Level 
Well-functioning compliance programs need to emphasize both the 
positive and negative incentives for compliance.  At the individual level, 
two major negative factors suggest a greater incentive for compliance.  
The first is incarceration.51  The second is financial penalties.52  Both 
types of penalties lend themselves to classroom instruction.53  An 
additional concern for more senior people within a firm to comply is 
debarment.  Individuals may be barred from serving as directors or 
officers of a public company or from the securities industry as a whole.54   
On the positive side, the need for compliance can be reinforced with an 
appeal to ethics—being compliant is ethical.55  There also are individual 
positive incentives for compliance in terms of allowing individuals who 
are compliant to reap financial rewards without the worry of clawback 
due to illegal gains. 
 
LEGAL STUD. 189 (2014).  
 48. Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: 
Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489 (1999); Min Zhang et al., Do Suppliers Applaud Corporate Social 
Performance?, 121 J. BUS. ETHICS 543 (2014). 
 49. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media, in THE 
RIGHT TO TELL: THE ROLE OF THE MASS MEDIA IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 107, 109, 122 (2002); 
Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World's Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 
1134 (2005) (“[Directors] do not like to be made the object of public scorn and ridicule.”). 
 50. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. OF POL. ECON. 288, 292 
(1980). 
 51. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 
88 J. FIN. ECON. 193 (2008); Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 38. 
 52. Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 
(1980); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:  FIRMS, MARKETS, 
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 138 (1985) (explaining how managers may risk their reputations “if the 
immediate gains are large enough and if they cannot be required to disgorge their ill gotten gains.”). 
 53. Eugene F. Soltes, A Letter from Prison, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE 110-045 (Dec. 2009, rev. Mar. 
2011), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=38193 (on file with the author).  
 54. Renee Jones, Unfit for Duty: The Officer and Director Bar as a Remedy for Fraud, 82 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 439 (2013). 
 55. Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance Through 
Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961 (2012) (providing a literature review). 
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C. Compliance is Global 
Because of global supply chains56 and the expansion of U.S. businesses 
to new markets,57 compliance has become a global phenomenon.  Firms 
must be concerned not merely with their own compliance but that of their 
suppliers and agents.  One high profile example of global compliance risk 
involves Apple’s supplier Foxconn.  Foxconn Technology Group is a 
Taiwanese company with factories in China.  Foxconn’s China operations 
have had a number of negative workplace condition related stories appear 
in the global press after multiple employee suicides and a factory 
explosion in China.58  Even though Apple was not directly responsible for 
these workplace problems, it faced significant criticism.59    
D. The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an area of growing 
importance to corporate life.  CSR initiatives have led to an increased 
level of scrutiny on the compliance function within a corporation.60  The 
increased emphasis on CSR for companies and their boards will increase 
the demand for CSR related compliance training and increase the supply 
of such training due to increased expenditures for CSR related 
compliance.  Whereas in the past many companies only paid lip service 
to CSR, increasingly CSR compliance has become accepted in many 
firms. 
Furthermore, the literature on the empirical economics of CSR is 
growing.61  Increasingly, CSR initiatives seem to be correlated to 
increased shareholder value.62  This trend has developed for a number of 
 
 56. Jennifer Blackhurst et al., An Empirically Derived Framework of Global Supply Resiliency, 32 
J. BUS. LOGISTICS 374 (2011).   
 57. Ricardo Flores et al., How Well Do Supranational Regional Grouping Schemes Fit 
International Business Research Models?, 44 J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 451 (2013). 
 58. Foxconn factory explosion in China kills three, BBC (May 20, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-13476800.  
 59. Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747 (2014). 
 60. See OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (Andrew Crane et al., eds., 
2009) (providing multiple definitions of CSR). 
 61. Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 51 (2012) (providing a literature review). 
 62. Joshua D. Margolis et al., Does it Pay to be Good . . . and Does it Matter? A Meta-Analysis of 
the Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial Performance, 
http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=10806509306508908200512206707703006703203701704
10860250230860080650830840641030140300570991001220060041051150850060070771200671160
38000015045102080099074095087120007016053064115115075102079009112083073123099068016
112105108081105090066118097105088096&EXT=pdf (unpublished manuscript). 
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reasons: employee hiring and retention,63 customer awareness,64 and 
customer demands.65  In addition, CSR related expenditures are being 
linked to improved financial performance because of the signaling value 
that CSR expenditures provide regarding credible corporate reporting of 
activities66 or reputational capital.67   
The increased attention of corporate governance, compliance, and CSR 
requires additional emphasis on CSR issues in compliance classes.  
Business schools have rolled out a number of CSR related courses and 
often include CSR within a larger ethics course.  Law schools lag behind 
business schools in their ability to identify where and how much to 
incorporate CSR in to law school curricula.  Currently, it appears no law 
school curriculum in a compliance class presently spends significant time 
addressing CSR.68  It is likely that this will change largely as a response 
to business realities. 
III. LAW SCHOOLS DO NOT UNDERSTAND COMPLIANCE 
If compliance is a growth area in law school education based on 
increased demand in the legal profession, it remains unclear whether law 
schools understand what teaching compliance is about.  Even fifteen years 
ago, the compliance function often was considered to be a backwater for 
legal practice, staffed by non-lawyers or by lawyers not in the more 
prestigious legal department.  In some cases, compliance reported to legal.  
This has changed, but law schools—precisely because of the historical 
discounting of compliance work—are ill equipped to meet the challenges 
of the new compliance reality.   
Compliance training and practice is about risk definition, assessment, 
and the management of risk.  This requires identification of risk and ex 
ante preventative action.  Nobel Prize winner Jean Tirole identifies this 
sort of compliance as active monitoring.69  He distinguishes active 
monitoring from retrospective monitoring, which he describes as passive 
 
 63. Daniel W. Greening & Daniel B. Turban, Corporate Social Performance as a Competitive 
Advantage in Attracting a Quality Workforce, 3 BUS. SOC. 254 (2000); Samuel Bowles et al., Incentive-
Enhancing Preferences: Personality, Behavior, and Earnings, 91 AMER. ECON. REV. 155 (2001). 
 64. Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm Value: 
The Role of Customer Awareness, 59 MGMT. SCI. 1045 (2013). 
 65. Charles J. Fombrun, Building corporate reputation through CSR initiatives: evolving 
standards, 8 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 7 (2005); Charles J. Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What’s in a Name? 
Reputation Building and Corporate Strategy, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 233 (1990).  
 66. Thomas Lys et al., Signaling through corporate accountability reporting, 60 J. ACCOUNTING 
& ECON. 56 (2015). 
 67. Paul C. Godfrey, The Relationship between Corporate Philanthropy and Shareholder Wealth: 
A Risk Management Perspective, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 783 (2005). 
 68. This observation is based on the compliance syllabi that the author has seen. 
 69. Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 9 (2001). 
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monitoring.70   
Active monitoring requires a sense of the costs of non-compliance,71 
the current state of both public and private enforcement and how 
compliance goals across regulators in the United States (and abroad) may 
lead to problems of a labyrinth of overlapping and at times contradictory 
enforcement goals and requirements for a given firm.  Adding to this 
difficulty for compliance programs is the increasing quantification of risk 
as well as pressures to make the spending on compliance efficient.  This 
is due to the fact that multiple distinct units within a company (board 
committees (often audit), general counsel, CFO, among others) may be 
involved in compliance.     
To solve regulatory complexity issues in an in-house setting, and for 
outside law firms to add value in compliance risk identification, 
assessment, and mitigation, students need to develop new skills.  These 
skills should include empirical methods in finance and accounting, data 
analytics, and understanding of organizational behavior.  They also 
should include skills in risk assessment based on an analysis of company 
and industry trends and anomalies as well as testing of various compliance 
and risk protocols.  An integrated educational approach also requires the 
use of case studies to contextualize compliance problems and provide fact 
patterns to grapple through issues that involve a misalignment of 
incentives within the firm, asymmetries in information, breakdowns in 
organizational design, and psychological factors that might impact 
individual behavior.  These issues and approaches are not integrated into 
the structure of most law school compliance classes.  The University of 
Florida currently incorporates such approaches in its global compliance 
class that I teach.  In addition, it offers a review of compliance materials 
that in-house lawyers use to offer insight into how to distill legal concerns 
into a form that non-lawyers can digest.  Some of these documents, such 
as codes of conduct, are often available on company websites.  Actual 
business documents help students better understand how workplace 
outputs look different for lawyer and non-lawyer audiences. 
A. The Traditional Case Method is Less Effective for a Compliance 
Class 
The traditional law school class uses a casebook as the primary source.  
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159 (2010).  The 
problem is simple—if a compliance officer says “yes,” the outcome of that decision, whether good or bad, 
will be known.  If she says “no,” the outcome will never be known.  That means that, all other things 
being equal, compliance officers have an incentive to say no.  They can’t be second-guessed.  The problem 
is that when “no” is the right answer, and the resulting investigation or penalty is avoided, there is no real 
way to attribute the absence of cost to the compliance officer’s advice.   
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The contents of a casebook are relatively straightforward: excerpts from 
cases with some introductory commentary on a specific topic and 
occasional statutory language.  Occasionally, case books also include 
short hypotheticals and review questions.  Whether or not traditional 
casebooks work pedagogically in traditional doctrinal classes is open to 
debate.72   
Whatever the general merits of law school casebooks, they seem to be 
ill suited to teach compliance effectively.  This is in part due to the legacy 
of law schools teaching cases and letting employers teach skills specific 
to a job.  This educational approach does not work for teaching students 
about complex businesses issues.  As Professor Robert Rhee explains, 
“[t]he curricula of most law schools are not well-suited to train lawyers 
for advising corporate clients in a sophisticated practice from the get-go, 
much less pursuing a career in business.”73  The lack of core courses in 
law school to prepare students for sophisticated practice, particularly in 
an area of complexity at the level of compliance, is even more critical.74  
Yet, many law school students lack the tools in business to better 
understand the impact of regulation on firm and individual behavior.75 
The regulatory landscape across areas of compliance remains unsettled.  
In some areas, regulation and enforcement priorities lead to rapid changes 
that cannot easily be incorporated into a law school casebook.  Other than 
a general overview of a particular type of issue, a better way of teaching 
would be to use business school case studies as core reading.76  This 
 
 72. See generally ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007). 
 73. Robert J. Rhee, Specialization in Law and Business: A Proposal for a J.D./‘M.B.L.’ 
Curriculum, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 37, 37 (2013); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden: 
Business Lawyers In Enron’s Dark Shadows, 57 BUS. LAW. 1421 (2002). 
 74. One might even suggest that most schools lack the curricula because most faculty have never 
advised corporate clients or been engaged in a sophisticated practice.  The traditional path of 3-4 years as 
a large law firm associate does not often mean skill in “advising clients,” not because the experience is 
not valuable, but because rarely does the CEO, board, or general counsel look to a fourth year associate 
for meaningful advice.  Unless faculty regularly consult or are active in the practitioner and policy groups 
in which they interact with practitioners at high levels, this limits the toolset of many law faculty. 
 75. Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the Business Education 
of Lawyers, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 363, 383 (2009) (“A thorough accounting treatment should be required 
in any business law curriculum.  Indeed, any serious business law student would be well advised to take 
an independent introductory financial accounting course.  If there was any doubt, the accounting scandals 
of Enron and WorldCom and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act resolved the matter.”). 
 76. See The Harvard Business School Case Method, HARV. BUS. SCH., 
http://www.hbs.edu/mba/academic-experience/Pages/the-hbs-case-method.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 
2015). (“When students are presented with a case, they place themselves in the role of the decision maker 
as they read through the situation and identify the problem they are faced with.  The next step is to perform 
the necessary analysis—examining the causes and considering alternative courses of actions to come to a 
set of recommendations.  To get the most out of cases, students read and reflect on the case, and then meet 
in learning teams before class to “warm up” and discuss their findings with other classmates.  In class—
under the questioning and guidance of the professor—students probe underlying issues, compare different 
alternatives, and finally, suggest courses of action in light of the organization’s objectives.”). 
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allows for the development of critical thinking skills based on richly 
detailed case studies regarding a particular compliance topic with many 
pages of exhibits of financials for a company or other supporting 
documents.77  Further, compliance requires lawyers to better understand 
how businesspeople approach issues where legal certainty often is not a 
given.  In addition, such studies show lawyers to how to be effective in 
providing guidance to stop behavior that is too risky.  Ultimately, students 
need to understand how businesspeople think and how to use some of the 
same tools that business schools use but with a heavier legal framing to 
allow law school students to better understand the thought process of 
people who are in the business unit.78  Prime case studies include Enron79 
and Satyam80 on accounting fraud and Siemens on anti-bribery issues,81 
among others. 
B. The Proactive Compliance Skillset is Important but Under 
Emphasized in Traditional Compliance Classes 
After exploring syllabi for compliance classes across a number of law 
schools, it becomes clear that without requiring pre-requisites, except 
perhaps corporations, these classes do not emphasize the importance of 
understanding the language of businesses or the issues and motivations of 
individuals and firms.  Nor do these classes seem to require an 
understanding of business strategy.  Further, much of the compliance 
function requires some basic understanding of accounting, finance, and 
economics.  Unless there are a series of pre-requisites for the class, a 
compliance class needs to include an understanding of these core concepts 
and integrate these concepts into each subsequent class’s discussion.  The 
 
 77. See Michelle M. Harner & Robert J. Rhee, Deal Deconstruction, Case Studies, and Case 
Simulations: Toward Practice Readiness with New Pedagogies in Teaching Business and Transactional 
Law, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 81, 92 (2014) (“The differences between the Langdellian case method and 
the business school case method are stark.  In the business school case method, there is no starting point 
analysis done by an expert, such as a lawyer or a judge, to criticize, deconstruct, or evaluate.  There are 
only facts and data, and often the problem or issue is not even explicitly stated.”); Todd D. Rakoff & 
Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 603 (2007) (“The archetypical 
‘case”’ at a business school consists of much more information, and a much more open-ended situation, 
than the appellate cases used in law schools.  They are taught by teachers asking different questions, often 
in classes as large as law school classes.”).  
 78. Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the Business Education 
of Lawyers, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 363, 363 (2009). (Law schools should “teach a little more business and 
a little less law.”). 
 79. Malcolm S. Salter, Innovation Corrupted: The Rise and Fall of Enron (A) and (B), HARV. BUS. 
SCH. (2004), https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/product/905048-PDF-ENG.  
 80. Ajai Gaur & Nisha Kohli, Governance Failure at Satyam, HARV. BUS. SCH. (2011), 
https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/product/W11095-PDF-ENG.  
 81. Paul M. Healy & Djordjija Petkoski, Fighting Corruption at Siemens, HARV. BUS. SCH. 
(2012), https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/product/112702-HTM-ENG.  
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failure of existing syllabi to incorporate active compliance issues and 
integrate these issues within a broader curriculum limits the effectiveness 
of such compliance programs. 
1. Incentives and Organizational Design 
Organizational design and incentives within the firm help to shape firm 
outcomes.  As such, understanding these issues and responding to them 
to create more effective incentives and organizational structures aid in 
creating a more effective set of compliance tools.82   
Organizations are complex83 and what works at one level of an 
organization may not work at another level of the same organization due 
to issues of complexity and organizational design.84  Understanding this 
complexity is important as the design of a firm impacts behavior within 
the firm.  A firm’s environment and the amount of individual discretion 
affect decision-making for the entire organization and may constrain the 
decision-making of individuals within it.  Understanding organizational 
structure and incentives may illuminate how to better structure closer-to-
optimal corporate compliance to police against compliance violations.85  
Day to day compliance is, in fact, the primary responsibility of the 
business unit heads rather than a compliance officer.  The compliance 
function is only there to assist the operation of the business, but because 
compliance officers do not have direct reporting-line authority over the 
businesses, they should not be the ones saddled with the responsibility. 
A core part of the literature in both economics and finance is the 
concept of agency costs.86  Within a firm, the agent may have incentives 
that differ from those of management.  Firms work to reduce this 
misalignment through improved monitoring.  There are, however, limits 
 
 82. See generally Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Paying for Risks:  Bankers, 
Compensation, and Competition (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 114), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/114.  
 83. Lauren B. Edelman & Marc C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 479 (1997); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost 
Approach, 87 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 548, 556 (1981); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES:  ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). 
 84. Frank R. Dobbin et al., The Expansion of Due Process in Organizations, in INSTITUTIONAL 
PATTERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS (Lynne G. Zucker, ed., 1988); James N. Baron et al., War and Peace: 
The Evolution of Modern Personnel Administration in U.S. Industry, 92 AM. SOC. REV. 350 (1986); Lynn 
G. Zucker, Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of 
Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 22 (1983); Neil Fligstein, The Spread of the 
Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 1919-1979, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 377 (1985). 
 85. Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top-Management-Team Tenure and 
Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 484 
(1990). 
 86. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 327–28 (1976). 
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to significant monitoring of agents.  Too much monitoring reduces the 
ability of agents to perform their jobs and might chill legal risk taking.87  
Such risk taking may serve to benefit the firm.  Therefore, effective 
compliance mitigates risk while it maintains freedom for the firm to 
undertake its business objectives.88  
Incentives within an organization matter to the design and 
implementation of a compliance program just as organizational design 
may contribute to compliance risk.  Understanding the incentives within 
organizations and their institutional structures may identify ways to create 
and promote a pro-compliance culture within a company.89   
Teaching about organizational design issues helps promote compliance 
by individuals within the company with legal and regulatory 
requirements.90  Complexity within a firm may increase agency costs, 
which in turn may lead to increased deviation from a pro-compliance 
culture.91  These higher agency costs, in turn, may serve to increase the 
 
 87. Because each firm is uniquely situated from the standpoint of effective compliance, 
corporation law only sets a low floor for holding managers liable under corporation law due to failure to 
monitor.  See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (ruling that 
only “a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to 
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system—will establish the lack of good faith that 
is a necessary condition to liability” and explaining that a failure of the duty to monitor is “possibly the 
most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”).  See also 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (stating that “absent cause for 
suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to 
ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists”).  See also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 
362, 370 (Del. 2006) (reinterpreting the Caremark duty as a loyalty duty and requiring a showing “that 
the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”).  For an analysis of Stone, 
see Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1769 (2007). 
 88. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 2013 Report 
outlines seventeen principles of effective internal controls: CONTROL ENVIRONMENT 1. 
Demonstrates commitment to integrity and ethical values 2. Exercises oversight responsibility 3. 
Establishes structure, authority, and responsibility 4. Demonstrates commitment to competence 5. 
Enforces accountability RISK ASSESSMENT 6. Specifies suitable objectives 7. Identifies and analyzes 
risk 8. Assesses fraud risk 9. Identifies and analyzes significant change CONTROL ACTIVITIES 10. 
Selects and develops control activities 11. Selects and develops general controls over technology 12. 
Deploys through policies and procedures INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION 13. Uses relevant 
information 14. Communicates internally 15. Communicates externally MONITORING 16. Conducts 
ongoing and/or separate evaluations 17. Evaluates and communicates deficiencies.  COSO Framework’s 
17 Principles of Effective Internal Control, WEAVER (Dec. 30, 2013), http://weaver.com/blog/coso-
framework%E2%80%99s-17-principles-effective-internal-control. 
 89. Trust within an organization also matters. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s 
Disintermediation: Buffett’s New Managerial Model, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509 (2015). 
 90. Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top-Management-Team Tenure and 
Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 484 
(1990). 
 91. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Organizational Diseconomies of Scale, 4 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRAT. 399 (1995); J. Myles Shaver & John M. Mezias, Diseconomies of Managing in 
Acquisitions: Evidence from Civil Lawsuits, 20 ORG. SCI. 206 (2009). 
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probability of illegal and unethical activity within a firm.92  
Part of the implementation of compliance programs is the inclusion of 
top management.  An effective compliance culture requires the support of 
top management.93  If top management shows an active and sincere 
embrace of compliance activities, this will change firm culture to one that 
is more pro-compliant.  Further, implementation requires fairness in 
implementation.  Such fairness serves a legitimating function for 
employees.94  This leads to better monitoring through improved reporting 
of potential wrongdoing and advice regarding whether or not behavior 
that merely is ambiguous creates legal risk.95  When employees feel that 
the firm’s culture is legitimate,96 this increases the credibility of a 
compliance program as its legitimacy will encourage employees to better 
report suspected wrongdoing.97  In other words, compliance that is only 
cosmetic in nature does not lead to better compliance.98   
Pro-compliant behavior needs more than just words.99  When firms 
take pro-compliant ethical values seriously, illegal behavior that can be 
observed shows a reduction in the total number of cases reported, but 
whether this reduces illegal behavior overall is not clear.100  One anecdote 
provides a telling example—the code of conduct at Enron was “state of 
the art” for its time.  However, the unethical and non-compliant norms at 
Enron were pervasive within the company.  Further, the unethical norms 
 
 92. Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, III, Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate 
Illegality, 8 ORG. SCI. 624 (1997). 
 93. Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top-Management-Team Tenure and 
Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 484 
(1990); Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Performance: Management 
Commitments, External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Practices, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 539 (1999). 
 94. Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What 
Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 139 (1999). 
 95. Howard Bergman & D Daniel Sokol, The Air Cargo Cartel: Lessons for Compliance, in ANTI-
CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: LENIENCY RELIGION 301 (Caron Beaton-Wells & 
Christopher Tran, eds., 2015). 
 96. Tom R. Tyler et al., The Ethical Commitment to Compliance: Building Value-Based Cultures, 
50 CAL. MGMT. REV. 31, 35 (2008); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively 
Regulate Employee Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACADEMY MGMT. 
J. 1143 (2005); Gary R. Weaver, Encouraging ethics in organizations: A review of some key research 
findings, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293 (2014). 
 97. Treviño et al., supra note 94.  See also INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., THE ICC ANTITRUST 
COMPLIANCE TOOLKIT:  PRACTICAL ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE TOOLS FOR SMES AND LARGER COMPANIES 
4 (2013) (“The key to any successful compliance program, whether it relates to antitrust or another topic, 
is to reach the stage where the behavior required under the program is an indistinguishable part of your 
company culture.”). 
 98. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491–92 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of 
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 106 (2002). 
 99. Treviño et al., supra note 94, at 149. 
 100. Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Treviño, Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs: 
Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315, 327-32 (1999). 
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were a function of the norm created by top management at Enron.101  
Unethical corporate culture as a whole creates greater compliance risk.102 
The same is true in particular for top management.103  
Implementation of compliance programs should be part of teaching 
compliance.  Too often teaching compliance focuses on compliance 
failures rather than on active compliance.  Similarly, implementation 
should incorporate ethical decision-making into both teaching and 
practice of compliance.104    
2. Ensuring the program has the right elements 
a. Risk Analysis (Identifying and Minimizing Legal Risk) 
Risk analysis plays a critical role in compliance planning and training.  
It creates a methodology to understand and plan for compliance risk, 
creates more effective monitoring for the board and management of 
compliance issues, and allows for testing of compliance controls within a 
company to improve compliance processes, protocols, and procedures.  
Simple risk matrixes can be used to explore these issues in class and 
include specific hypotheticals of behavior for the class to put within the 
risk matrix. 
Companies have different compliance risks based on numerous factors.  
For example, the structure of executive compensation may lead to 
potential risk for compliance because of the nature of the incentives.105  If 
incentives are not properly aligned, agents might inflate earnings because 
of the potential short term payout to them.106  This seems to be particularly 
true with excessive option related financial compensation to top 
executives or managers.107   
 
 101. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING 
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2004). 
 102. BARBARA LEY TOFFLER, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED, AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR 
ANDERSEN (2004); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Responsibility of Corporations and 
Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS 
L.J. 1 (2003); Milton C. Regan, AALS Annual Meeting Article: Moral Intuitions and Organizational 
Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941 (007). 
103 James E. Hunton et al., The Relationship between Perceived Tone at the Top and Earnings Quality, 
28 Contemporary Accounting Research 1190 (2011). 
 104. Lynne S. Payne, Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72 HARV. BUS. REV. 106 (1994). 
 105. Sharon Hannes & Avraham Tabbach, Agency Costs and Misrepresentation in Leveraged 
Firms, 40 IOWA J. CORP. L. 99 (2014); Shane A. Johnson et al., Managerial Incentives and Corporate 
Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter, 13 REV. FIN. 115 (2009); Ling Peng & Ailsa Röell, Executive 
Pay and Shareholder Litigation, 12 REV. FIN. 141, 143 (2008); Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 82. 
 106. David J. Denis et al., Is There a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 467, 
468 (2006) 
 107. See Sharon Hannes, Compensating for Executive Compensation: The Case for Gatekeeper 
Incentive Pay, 98 CAL. L. REV. 385 (2010). 
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Classes can explore how to identify risk and various risk assessment 
methodologies and processes that are tailored to the specific types and 
levels of compliance and compliance risk within a firm.  This means 
teaching that there are different compliance risks and training needs at 
different levels within an organization based upon function, level, 
probability of risk, and the impact of compliance issues within the firm.  
Risk factors that may drive illegal behavior should also be taught.  The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
describes these factors to include a lack of commitment by 
management,108 legal uncertainty,109 employee error,110 misalignment of 
incentives,111 and rogue employees.112   
b. Mitigation 
One critical thing to teach in the classroom setting is that the creation 
of a well-functioning and robust compliance program does not mean that 
the compliance program will be fool-proof.  Complex global 
organizations have many moving parts.  Part of teaching includes 
identifying legal regimes that have understood that a corporate misdeed 
does not necessarily mean that the compliance program does not work.113  
For example, the United States Sentencing Guidelines provide that proper 
oversight of a compliance program will be taken into account for 
sentencing, which explains the importance of top management’s 
oversight on compliance issues: “The organization’s governing authority 
shall be knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance 
and ethics program and shall exercise reasonable oversight with respect 
to the implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics 
 
 108. Promoting Compliance with Competition Law 2011, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 
(2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Promotingcompliancewithcompetitionlaw2011.pdf. 
 109. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal 
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The 
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005) (“Although some areas have too many 
detailed rules that do not reflect current production processes, other areas are dangerously under-regulated, 
with no standard to direct industry behavior.”). 
 110. For a discussion on employee error in the context of organizational processes, see DIANE 
VAUGHN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (1985. 
 111. Shane A. Johnson et al., Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of 
Incentives Matter, 13 REV. FIN. 115 (2009); Sharon Hannes, Managers vs. Regulation: Post-Enron 
Regulation and the Great Recession, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 279 (2013); Jap Efendi et al., Why Do 
Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other 
Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667 (2007); Giancarlo Spagnolo, Managerial Incentives and Collusive 
Behavior, 49 EUR. ECON. REV. 1501 (2005). 
 112. See Krawiec, supra note 98.  
 113. See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994). 
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program.”114  Similarly, both the U.S. and UK governments have 
explained the importance of allocating “adequate” resources to the 
compliance function, which in the UK operates as a defense.115  In the 
case of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, this includes a discussion of the 
following language and its implications.  The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
make such a distinction clear: 
(a) To have an effective compliance and ethics program, 
for purposes of subsection (f) of §8C2.5 (Culpability 
Score) and subsection (b)(1) of §8D1.4  (Recommended 
Conditions of Probation—Organizations), an organization 
shall— 
    (1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect 
criminal conduct; and 
(2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that 
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law. 
 
Such compliance and ethics program shall be reasonably 
designed, implemented, and enforced so that the program 
is generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal 
conduct.  The failure to prevent or detect the instant 
offense does not necessarily mean that the program is not 
generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal 
conduct.”116 
Classes should spend some time working through the importance of the 
Sentencing Guidelines because of the assumptions that the Guidelines use 
about compliance.  The Sentencing Guides articulate seven steps to an 
effective compliance program.117  These can be used in class as a 
springboard to discuss effective compliance programs that have led to 
penalty mitigation in real world settings.  An example of this is the 
compliance program efforts made by Morgan Stanley that led to 
prosecution of an individual, but not the firm, for an FCPA violation.  
Classes should include a discussion of the press release of the case, which 
details the Department of Justice’s decision not to prosecute Morgan 
Stanley: 
“This defendant [the individual rogue employee] used a 
 
 114. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (2014)). 
 115. See The United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 c. 23, § 7. See also A Resource Guide to the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2015). 
 116. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2011) (emphasis 
added). 
 117. Id. 
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web of deceit to thwart Morgan Stanley’s efforts to 
maintain adequate controls designed to prevent 
corruption.  Despite years of training, he circumvented 
those controls for personal enrichment.  We take seriously 
our role in detecting and prosecuting efforts to evade 
those controls,” said U.S. Attorney Lynch . . . . 
 
According to court documents, Morgan Stanley 
maintained a system of internal controls meant to ensure 
accountability for its assets and to prevent employees 
from offering, promising or paying anything of value to 
foreign government officials.  Morgan Stanley’s internal 
policies, which were updated regularly to reflect 
regulatory developments and specific risks, prohibited 
bribery and addressed corruption risks associated with the 
giving of gifts, business entertainment, travel, lodging, 
meals, charitable contributions and employment.  Morgan 
Stanley frequently trained its employees on its internal 
policies, the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.  
Between 2002 and 2008, Morgan Stanley trained various 
groups of Asia-based personnel on anti-corruption 
policies 54 times.  During the same period, Morgan 
Stanley trained Peterson on the FCPA seven times and 
reminded him to comply with the FCPA at least 35 times.  
Morgan Stanley’s compliance personnel regularly 
monitored transactions, randomly audited particular 
employees, transactions and business units, and tested to 
identify illicit payments.  Moreover, Morgan Stanley 
conducted extensive due diligence on all new business 
partners and imposed stringent controls on payments 
made to business partners.118 
This example builds the case for firms to invest in pro-active 
compliance because of the potential cost savings of financial and 
reputational penalties as well as the imposition of corporate monitors as 
part of a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement.119 
Another DOJ press release, this time in the antitrust area, offers 
compliance classes an important example of how a firm can create a 
credible compliance program to receive a lower sentence for a violation 
after it previously received penalties for non-compliance.  Put differently, 
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http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html. 
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a firm can learn how to make compliance more effective after it has been 
through a compliance problem.  An illustrative example of this is Barclays 
plea bargain in the Forex cartel, following its collusion in the Libor cartel.  
In the Libor cartel, the plea agreement for Barclays regarding its 
wrongdoing in price fixing and manipulation of Libor120 cost the firm 
$455 million in financial penalties.  Further, within a few days of the press 
release of its settlement with DOJ, its CEO resigned under significant 
pressure and media scrutiny.121  This was not to be the only time that 
Barclays would be caught within an antitrust context for violating the law.  
However, what changed was Barclays response to compliance.  After its 
penalties in the Libor cartel, Barclays instituted a robust compliance 
program.  The implementation of a robust compliance program at 
Barclays after the Libor antitrust collusion violation saved Barclays 
considerably because of a subsequent cartel case.  On May 20, 2015, five 
major investment banks pleaded guilty for collusion in the foreign 
currency exchange (Forex) spot market.122  The credit for the compliance 
program appears in a single line in the Barclays plea agreement: “The 
parties further agree that Recommended Sentence is sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3553(a), 3572(a), in considering, among other factors, the substantial 
improvements to the defendant’s compliance and remediation program to 
prevent recurrence of the charged offense.”123  None of the other 
investment banks received this credit.   
These examples help students to contextualize the benefits of 
compliance programs and to help them to make arguments to potential 
clients (or to their superiors within an in-house setting) about the benefits 
of resource allocation for compliance programs. 
IV CONCLUSION 
Compliance is a growing field in both legal education and practice.  
Overall, whether compliance teaching is geared towards students or 
individuals within a company, greater care and nuance must be taken in 
undertaking compliance teaching and training to reflect the inter-
disciplinary and proactive elements of the creation of robust and effective 
compliance programs.  Increasingly, this means that lawyers and law 
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professors need to incorporate insights from other disciplines in their 
teaching to use more case studies.   
